Mission creep in Venezuela

Last month, The Washington Post published a story regarding a September 2 U.S. military strike against a suspected drug smuggling boat off the coast of Venezuela. The controversy surrounding the strike is centered around the fact that there was allegedly an order — it remains to be decisively determined who issued it — to kill shipwrecked survivors. Since the story, there has been near constant debate over whether or not this order constituted a war crime with even some prominent conservative legal voices weighing in with skepticism of the administration’s account of what happened. While this is undoubtedly an important story that deserves attention, incessant debate over a singular strike is a perfect encapsulation of the age-old idiom of “missing the forest for the trees.” 

Over the past eleven months, the Trump administration has been going pedal to the metal on a whole host of issues and initiatives. In the interest of expediency, however, the administration has relied on executive orders and unilateral actions to pursue what it sees as desired policy objectives. The current showdown with Venezuela’s President Nicolas Maduro also fits into this pattern, albeit in an increasingly scatterbrained manner. Just look at the changing stated objectives (otherwise known as “mission creep”) coming from the White House and the Pentagon regarding Venezuela.  

Back in September (as displayed by the initial boat strikes), the administration stated that the goal of its military actions in the Caribbean was aimed at stopping the flow of illegal drugs into the United States. More specifically, the White House views the importation of fentanyl into the U.S. as a national security threat, going as far to calling the synthetic opioid a “weapon of mass destruction.” While Venezuela certainly meets most of the benchmarks to be considered a narco-state, it is not a chief purveyor of fentanyl. Caracas is a world-leading trafficker of cocaine (which, when laced with fentanyl, leads to a significant chance of user overdose), but most of the fentanyl trafficked into the U.S. comes by way of Mexico. The precursors for fentanyl often originate in China and India and then make the long trek across the Pacific to Mexico. From there, the fentanyl is processed and trafficked by Mexican cartels, most notably the Sinaloa Cartel. Interestingly enough, the Trump administration recently pardoned the former Honduran President Juan Orlando Hernandez who was previously convicted of facilitating the actions of and accepting bribes from the Sinaloa Cartel. In short, if the goal is to stop fentanyl from flooding into America, the focus should be on the U.S.-Mexico border (where the administration has done an effective job) and not in the Caribbean. But don’t take my word for it; take the Drug Enforcement Agency’s National Drug Threat Assessment report for 2025. While Mexico is mentioned ad infinitum in the report’s section on fentanyl, Venezuela is not mentioned once. 

So if it’s not fentanyl, then what else could the administration’s objective in Venezuela be? Perhaps enforcing sanctions related to Venezuelan oil? In recent weeks, U.S. military forces have stopped and seized oil tankers off the coast of Venezuela. Initially, the administration alleged that these tankers were helping traffic sanctioned oil emanating from Iran and thus subject to seizure. However, yesterday the administration made it clear that the ultimate goal is forcing Maduro from power. Recently, Trump has stated that the focus on oil transcends the sea-lanes. Last week, Trump said, “We want it back… They took our oil rights — we had a lot of oil there. As you know they threw our companies out, and we want it back.” This is in reference to some land-based oil assets that were seized from American companies by Maduro’s predecessor Hugo Chavez. 

As of this writing, President Trump said that it would be “smart” of Maduro to leave power. For those keeping score at home, the mission creep evolution since September has been as follows: drug interdiction, sanctions enforcement, regime change. In fairness to Trump, Venezuela has been a thorn in the side of every presidential administration since Bill Clinton’s. Caracas is a Latin American outpost of Russian and Chinese interests. Venezuela also has a record of helping Iranian proxies such as Hezbollah through its practice of drug trafficking.  

All that being said, does America want to be involved in Latin American regime change? Additionally, why is the administration slow rolling its way into a potential war without consulting Congress? It would be wholly different if there was a singular strike on a drug boat or processing center that was a one-off like this summer’s strikes on Iran. However, this is a persistent and ongoing campaign, not a strike. It is also, as of late, a campaign with the objective of toppling a government. What would potentially come after Maduro? Is the U.S. deploying troops into Caracas? 

Mission creep is bad enough as it is. It is made worse if there is no meaningful debate over the speed at which the mission is creeping. While there has been debate coming from Democratic lawmakers (who reflexively despise the Trump White House), there have also been voiced trepidations coming from Republican lawmakers. Susan Collins (R-ME) perhaps said it best following a meeting with Secretary of State Marco Rubio: “The briefing … helped somewhat, but there’s still a lack of clarity … aside from the drug issue of why we’re involved in this country’s [Venezuela’s} leadership.” Senators Rand Paul (R-KY), Lindsey Graham (R-SC), and Roger Marshall (R-KS) also expressed confusion and hesitancy regarding the administration’s ever-evolving posture toward Venezuela. Whether more GOP lawmakers start to assert congressional authority vis a vis Venezuela policy is doubtful at present as Congress recesses for the holidays. 

Like so much of the past year, the Trump administration is struggling to come up with a coherent pitch regarding its actions in the Caribbean. In a way, the September 2 controversy has helped the administration. Our national dialogue is largely focused on one incident rather than the wider policy associated with it. Venezuelan “Chavismo” ideology has been a thorn in American and Latin American politics for almost 30 years. The departure of Maduro could very well be a good thing. But the same was said of Saddam Hussein’s ouster in Iraq (and that war had a resolution passed by Congress). Also, what if the current course fails or falls into limbo? Maduro’s grip on Venezuela could undoubtedly be strengthened (see Fidel Castro and the Bay of Pigs in 1961). 

If the U.S. is heading for regime change in Caracas, there needs to be a congressional debate about it. Lawmakers should go on record and assert their constitutional power. Unfortunately, it seems that Trump is pursuing the same type of policy that President Obama did in Libya in 2011: military action abroad with little to no concern about domestic protestations or long-term consequences. If there was ever a time to have a healthy debate over presidential war powers, it would be right now. Instead, the current administration is making things up on the fly and Congress is enjoying its recess. Feliz Navidad indeed….

Jim Pomeroy, raised in Bucks County and a former congressional aide, works in higher education. He is the author of Alliances & Armor: Communist Diplomacy and Armored Warfare during the War in Vietnam.